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The Identification of Customary International Law:
Institutional and Methodological Pluralism in
U.S. Courts
Noah A. Bialos

Abstract
It is well established that there is a consensus, two-element approach to the identification
of customary international law. Among international courts and organizations, a customary rule
is identified based on evidence of a general practice by states, which is accepted as law. Customary
international law, however, is also subject to identification at the national level. For centuries,
questions regarding the existence and content of customary international rules have arisen in
national courts. Given their own institutionalized methods of resolving legal ambiguity, national
courts are thus routinely faced with a normative conflict: is the appropriate method for identifying
rules of customary international law located in the national or international realm? By using
customary international law as a case study, this Article offers a more nuanced understanding of
how international law is localized into U.S. courts. While prevailing theories posit that the
diffusion of international rules results in national acceptance or rejection, this empirical analysis
demonstrates how normative pluralism may also generate hybridization. As international
integration accelerated after World War II, U.S. judges increasingly relied on hybrid models of
decision-making that sought legitimacy within both the national and international legal systems.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
It is well established that customary rules are a source of international law.
What is less settled is how to identify the existence and content of such rules.
Indeed, the very premise of customary international law (CIL)—that the rules are
not necessarily legislatively or textually confirmed—reveals the inherent difficulty
of identifying extant rules. This identification question has recently generated
renewed interest in the consensus international approach to identifying the rules
of CIL, or, put differently, the customary approach to identifying CIL.
Under the prevailing approach at the international level, a rule of CIL is
identified based on two elements: (1) evidence of a general practice by states that
is (2) accepted as law.1 Although there is some disagreement around the margins,
the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, as well as the consistent
practice of numerous other international bodies, reflects international consensus
on this two-element approach.
The International Law Commission (ILC) has recently worked to textually
confirm and develop the consensus international method, in part because of
divergent approaches at the national level.2 National divergence is seen as a threat
to custom’s stability and legitimacy and is thought to arise from ignorance among
national judges about the international approach.3 In line with positivist and
process-based theories of international law, the prevailing view is that there is a
singular, true international approach that national judges have internalized or
purposively decided to adopt.4 This Article challenges such actor-centric theories
by examining whether the experience of U.S. courts regarding identification
questions is more phenomenological5 than previously understood.
1
2
3

4
5

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S.
993.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/70/10, at 32–42
(2015).
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, at 305 (2011)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc A/66/10] (“There are differing approaches to the formation and
identification of customary international law. Yet an appreciation of the process of its formation
and identification is essential for all those who have to apply the rules of international law. Securing
a common understanding of the process could be of considerable practical importance. This is so
not least because questions of customary international law increasingly fall to be dealt with by those
who may not be international law specialists, such as those working in the domestic courts of many
countries, those in government ministries other than Ministries for Foreign Affairs, and those
working for non-governmental organizations.”).
See, for example, HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 3 (2011) (describing the positivist conception of international law).
Phenomenology refers to the structures and models of consciousness and behavior that shape the
decisions and arguments of individuals. It is to be distinguished from ontology, which considers
decisions and arguments to be driven purely by analysis and rationality. See Phenomenology, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Dec. 16, 2013), http://perma.cc/9G7V-P6RW. For an additional
citation on phenomenology versus ontology, see John Meyer, Reflections on Institutional Theory and
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The analysis herein is motivated by sociological institutional theory,
specifically its world society and organizational variants. World society theory
proposes a structural, phenomenological explanation for the diffusion and
replication of international models over time. In an increasingly integrated world,
global models take myriad forms, including individual rights as the model form of
social justice and the university as the exemplary form of higher education.6
According to sociological institutionalism, global models are enacted at the
national level because of their institutionalization in world society, not because of
national needs or interests. Similarly, organizational institutionalism posits that, in
response to decisional uncertainty, organizations mimic institutionalized models
of their organizational field.7 In a field like the U.S. legal system, exogenous and
endogenous models of appropriate behavior, rather than purposive rational action
by individual judges, shape decision making.8
By drawing on institutional theory, this Article develops how the twoelement approach to identifying CIL is an institutionalized model of world society
that has structured action in the international legal system for the past century.
Critical to this isomorphism was the international development of typified
language relating to customary law’s two constitutive elements. To signal
legitimacy within the international arena, organizations, including courts and
arbitral tribunals, incorporate the legitimated methodology of the two-element
approach.
Along with its institutionalization at the international level, however, CIL is
also subject to social definition and application at the national level. For centuries,
questions regarding the existence and content of customary international rules
have arisen in national courts in a variety of substantive areas, including on issues
of immunity, international crimes, and human rights.9 National courts, which have
their own institutionalized rules for resolving legal ambiguity, have thus been faced
with an apparent institutional contradiction: is the appropriate institutionalized

6
7
8
9

World Society, in WORLD SOCIETY: THE WRITINGS OF JOHN MEYER 36, 46–47 (Goerg Krucken &
Gili Drori eds., 2009) [hereinafter WORLD SOCIETY].
See generally Patricia Bromley & John W. Meyer, Hyper-Organization: Global Organizational
Expansion (2015).
See generally John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and
Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977) (describing organizational institutionalism).
Id.; see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to
Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888 (2011).
See, for example, Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (using customary
international law to identify the contours of personal inviolability, including widely recognized
exceptions); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”); cf. James Coleman, Social
Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action, 91 AM. J. SOC. 1309, 1313 (1986) (“All case law is based
inherently on a theory of action . . . based on the conception of purposive individuals with rights
and interests, who are responsible for their actions.”).
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model for identifying CIL located in the national or international realm? This
Article examines how plural institutionalized models generate judicial uncertainty
and variation in practice.
To better understand the variation, this Article draws on a systematic content
analysis of over three hundred U.S. federal court cases decided between 1945 and
2015 in which the existence of a rule of CIL was in question. On the basis of those
cases, the Article proposes a typology of identification approaches and examines
how methodological variation has shifted over time. The three approaches—
developed herein as the “internationalist,” “voluntarist,” and “exceptionalist”
approaches—reflect distinctive treatments of the internationalized model.10 The
internationalist variant reflects adoption of the international method of rule
identification; the voluntarist approach adapts the internationalized model to
accommodate institutionalized decision-making logics of the U.S. legal system;
and the exceptionalist approach rejects the international model in favor of a
national approach.
Using that typology, this Article seeks to develop a more nuanced
understanding of how institutional pluralism shapes judicial decision-making and
the evolution of international law in the U.S. courts. As the invocation of
international norms in U.S. courts has increased since World War II, there has
been a significant increase in judicial reference to the international method. Yet
the prevailing approach has been the hybrid voluntarist model, which requires
confirmation that U.S. practice adheres to the internationally derived rule. This
pattern of hybridization has significant implications for the usage, content, and
legitimacy of international law in U.S. courts, as well as the normative coherence
of the international legal system.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Section II introduces the sociological
institutional theory that informs the analysis. Section III elaborates the consensus
international approach to the identification question. Section IV considers how
plural institutional methods have shaped the treatment of international law in U.S.
courts. Lastly, Section V develops a typology of U.S. approaches to the
identification question.

10

At the outset, it is important to emphasize that this Article does not question the international
consensus on customary international law. Even were it to be empirically established that there
exists a distinctive U.S. judicial approach to the identification of customary rules—an inquiry that
is beyond the scope of this Article—it is not suggested here that any such method would undermine
the international consensus surrounding the “two-element” approach. To the contrary, this Article
recognizes the discounted value that is traditionally accorded to judicial practice—as compared to
executive or diplomatic practice—for the purpose of assessing state practice under customary
international law. In this vein, it should be understood merely as an effort to unpack U.S. federal
courts’ institutional approach to identification questions.
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II. I NTERNATIONAL L EGAL N ORMS AS I NSTITUTIONALIZED
M ODELS OF W ORLD S OCIETY
Sociological institutionalism proposes that behavior is shaped by
institutionalized models that take on a “rule-like status in social thought and
action.”11 Such models operate at the cultural level and inform what is considered
rational, legitimate, and normative. Unlike realist theories of action that emphasize
how interests generate behavior—and view institutions as epiphenomenal of such
behavior—neo-institutional theory proposes that action is structured by culturally
constituted logics of appropriateness.12 As such logics diffuse, they become takenfor-granted moral assumptions that are folded into the fabric of society and into
the decisions of organizations and individuals.
A core proposition of neo-institutional theory is that its explanatory power
transcends societal levels. The influence of legitimated institutionalized models
can be observed and tested across global, national, and local cultures. For example,
the theory’s propositions have motivated studies on the extent of homogeneity
across world culture, as well as across specialized organizational fields at the local
level.13 While orthodox institutionalisms suggest that actors unconsciously and
unknowingly enact models, variants of the theory have considered whether
institutions instead constrain the range of thinkable alternatives. In other words,
as it concerns the well-trodden dialectic between structure and agency,
institutionalisms vary in their emphasis on structural influence, but their common
conviction is that institutionalized environments shape what is all too often
understood to be simply agentic, purposive behavior.14

A. Neo-Institutional Theory’s World Society Variant
Over the past half-century, neo-institutional scholarship has demonstrated
how linkages to world society explain the diffusion of models of action across the
globe. As the international community integrated following World War II,
professionals working through and within international governmental and nongovernmental organizations developed models in a broad range of fields of global
concern.15 Among other examples, the university became the model of higher
education around the world, individual and human rights became the unified
11
12

13
14
15

Meyer & Rowan, supra note 7, at 341.
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 29 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds., 1991) (describing the “central logic” of institutional orders as a “set of material
practices and symbolic structures—which constitute its organizing principles . . .”) [hereinafter THE
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM].
See generally WORLD SOCIETY: THE WRITINGS OF JOHN MEYER, supra note 5.
Id. at 13.
See generally Bromley & Meyer, supra note 6.
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measure of social justice, and hyper-rationalized management displaced traditional
bureaucracy as the optimal organizational form for progress. These international
models were developed to homogenize and standardize expectations of behavior
internationally and stabilize the world order.16
While national adoption of global models is often styled as a functional
solution to a pressing social problem, or as agentic processes of internalization or
adoption,17 world society theory proposes that national enactment of international
models is often more ceremonial than real. The ordered realism baked into
national implementation is constructed and supported by rationalized myths of
the global polity.18 Empirical studies have demonstrated that there is considerable
disjunction between the ceremonial adoption of global models in areas such as
human rights, environmentalism, education, and the on-the-ground practices of
national governments.19 From the perspective of institutional theory, this
decoupling is a necessary feature of global society, as it maintains universalistic
notions of common rationality grounded in national sovereignty and individual
actorhood.20 With time, however, the institutionalized models often penetrate
local societies and become the rationalized model of behavior across
organizational levels.

B. Translation, Editing, and Organizational Analysis
One way in which variation is theorized to occur is through institutional
pluralism. Models are developed within particular societal sectors—such as world
society, national legal systems, or professions—before interaction between sectors
leads to friction and contestation.21 For organizations embedded within multiple
normative orders with conflicting institutionalized logics, the taken-for-granted
assumptions of one environment may conflict with those of another.22 Many
international legal scholars understand this contestation as a process of
replacement, whereby a dominant model takes the place of another model,
typically through processes of persuasion or socialization.23 Yet, organizational
16
17

18
19
20
21

22
23

Id. at 7.
See, for example, Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203–05 (1996); see
generally RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013).
MEYER, supra note 5, at 46–49.
Id.
Id. at 51.
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 29 (describing institutions as shapers of interest and
cultural frames on the international level; institutional contradictions arise when two institutions
have to fit together at the micro level).
Mary B. Dunn & Candace Jones, Institutional Logics and Institutional Pluralism: The Contestation
of Care and Science Logics in Medical Education, 1967–2005, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 114, 115 (2010).
See, for example, Koh, supra note 17; GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 17.
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institutionalism has developed how contestation may result in hybridization rather
than replacement—pluralism may generate hybrid forms that seek legitimacy in
multiple environments.24
In the context of world society theory, Scandinavian institutionalism usefully
explores two processes by which global models are adapted to local environments.
The first is a process of “translation”—the diffused model remains largely intact
but is not “passively transferred wholesale from one setting to another.”25 And
the second is a process of “editing”—externally derived models are edited and
actively reshaped by local participants.26 According to such accounts, individuals
remain constructed by external sources and are not atomistic actors with a priori
interests that determine behavior.27
The upshot of the foregoing is that institutionalization of a global model, if
it occurs, may be a haphazard, messy process that is not nearly as systematic or
purposive as actor-centric theories suggest.28 In contrast to realist theories of
interest-driven adoption and compliance, neo-institutional theory offers a more
dynamic, nuanced alternative for understanding the reconciliation of institutional
contradictions at national or local levels.29 What prevails will not necessarily be the
model that most efficiently addresses local needs, nor the model that reflects
instrumental interests, but instead the model that posits that organizational
behavior is shaped by externally derived, plural, and often shifting conceptions of
legitimacy30 within the organizational field.31 Indeed, as organizations face choices,
they refer to exogenous models of legitimate behavior from those in comparable
situations. And as models are adapted and diffused through an organizational
field, the hybridized, plural logic comes to be presented in rationalistic terms. In
the process, the hybrid model may ultimately come to be seen as the legitimate
and rational model of behavior.32
Because of its particular relevance to this Article, it is also worth noting how
neo-institutional theory departs from old institutionalisms, including legal process
24
25
26
27
28

29
30

31
32

Dunn & Jones, supra note 22.
David F. Suárez & Patricia Bromley, Institutional Theories and Levels of Analysis: History, Diffusion, and
Translation, in WORLD CULTURE RE-CONTEXTUALISED, 139, 145 (Jurgen Schriewer ed., 2018).
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 141 (“Overstressing the transformative role of domestic actors and specific contexts may lead
to a naïve optimism about agency[,] but . . . a problem with the isomorphism thesis is its failure to
grasp the processes and mechanisms which are typical of the always selective re-contextualization
of global models, ideas, and policies.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 141.
Legitimacy here refers to a “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate, within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs,
and definitions.” Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995).
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 28–31 (citing Meyer & Rowan, supra note 7).
Suárez & Bromley, supra note 25, at 146.
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theories that inform contemporary international law scholarship.33 While there are
several core differences, the salient one for this Article is that new institutionalisms
move away from socialization theories that focus on normative persuasion and
internalization as the basis for behavior.34 Instead, neo-institutionalism suggests
that models inform organizational choices by structuring menus of legitimate and
taken-for-granted rules of behavior.35 Rather than persuading actors of a model’s
functional or moral appropriateness, institutional environments create the lenses
through which actors view the world and understand categories of action and
thought, rather than persuading purposive actors.36 Institutionalization remains
iterative and interactive but is less purposive or normative than previously
understood.

III. T HE I NTERNATIONAL A PPROACH TO THE
I DENTIFICATION OF C USTOMARY I NTERNATIONAL L AW
International law began as a set of customary rules that developed external
to national legal fields. The law of nations—as international law was previously
known—was comprised of supranational rules relating to international questions
such as the navigation of the high seas and diplomatic relations. Until the relatively
recent proliferation of treaties, most such rules were uncodified. In effect, they
were institutionalized rules of the international community of nations—taken-forgranted assumptions about appropriate behavior among nation states.
Since World War II, many customary rules have been formalized in
multilateral treaties, yet much of CIL remains unwritten. Faced with the attendant
uncertainty of applying unwritten rules, the two main international courts of
justice—the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court
of Justice (ICJ)—developed a guiding standard for identifying the existence and
33

34

35
36

Harold Koh, Why do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2656–57 (1997) (“Social
internalization occurs when a norm acquires so much public legitimacy that there is widespread
general obedience to it. Political internalization occurs when political elites accept an international
norm, and adopt it as a matter of government policy. Legal internalization occurs when an
international norm is incorporated into the domestic legal system through executive action, judicial
interpretation, legislative action, or some combination of the three.”) (emphasis added).
The agentic socialization view is often found in the social-constructivist approach to international
relations. On the process of international socialization and its socialization agents, see also Martha
Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887,
902 (1998); Vaughn P. Shannon, Norms are What States Make Them: The Political Psychology of Norm
Violation, 44 INT’L STUD. Q. 293, 297 (2000); WESLEY L. GOULD & MICHAEL BARKUN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 128–30 (1970); Martha Finnemore, International
Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and
Science Policy, 47 INT’L ORG. 565, 568–70 (1993); Anthony Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International
Law and International Politics, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 107, 134 (1998).
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 15.
Id. at 13.
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content of such rules that has structured organizational practice within the
international field for the past century.37 While the initial formulation of the
international model was the product of conscious design, its taken-forgrantedness in the international system has resulted from processes of legitimation
and institutionalization.
Critical to the method’s institutionalization has been the evolution of typified
language of CIL relating to its two constitutive elements: (1) generalized state
practice and (2) opinio juris (a sense of legal obligation). To signal legitimacy within
the international arena, organizations, including courts and arbitral tribunals,
incorporate this methodology to demonstrate that they are “acting on collectively
valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner.”38

A. The International Court of Justice
The enumeration of the sources of international law in the Statute of the ICJ
is considered authoritative within the international legal system. Among the
sources identified is CIL: Article 38(1)(b) provides that the Court shall apply
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”39 This
definition, which is identical to the one contained in Article 38(b) of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, reflects a longstanding understanding
of CIL as consisting of an objective and subjective element.40 Within the
decentralized international legal system, state practice (the objective element) in
conformity with a sense of legal obligation (the subjective element) serves as
evidence of state consent to the rule in question.
ICJ jurisprudence has refined the two-element approach through regular
invocation and elaboration.41 For the purposes of this Article, the Court’s nuanced
deviations from the generalized model are less important than how the general
approach to identification questions has become the taken-for-granted model in
the international legal system. Indeed, a vast number of international courts and
tribunals, including the international criminal tribunals, the World Trade
37
38
39
40

41

League of Nations, Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 16 December 1920, Art.
38(1)(b); United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, Art. 38(1)(b).
Meyer & Rowan, supra note 7, at 50.
United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, Art. 38(1)(b).
The Spanish legal philosopher Francisco Suárez radically shifted the understanding of customary
international law away from natural law principles and towards the subjective notion of legal
obligation. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 139 (2010) (“Borrowing from
canon law, Suárez indicated that ‘[c]ustom is a kind of law [ius] introduced by usages and accepted
as law.”).
See, for example, Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266 (November 20) (elaborating on
the required elements of (1) uniform state practice that is (2) mutually accepted as law); Fisheries
(U.K. v Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116 (December 18) (elaborating on two-element approach);
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
14 (June 27) (indicating that state practice must only exhibit “general” conformity).
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Organization’s dispute settlement bodies, and international arbitral tribunals,
routinely and reflexively use the international model.42 As the International Law
Commission (ILC) notes, “[n]otwithstanding the specific contexts in which these
other courts and tribunals work, overall there is substantial reliance on the
approach and case law of ICJ, including the constitutive role attributed to the two
elements of State practice and opinio juris.”43 Existing jurisprudence leaves
evidentiary questions open to debate, particularly as to the existence and content
of particular rules, but the two-element approach has itself remained consistent,
uniform, and accepted.

B. The International Law Commission
The ILC is an expert subsidiary body of the U.N. General Assembly with a
mandate to codify and progressively develop international law.44 After several
decades of focusing on the development of draft treaties, in 2012 the ILC turned
its attention to the formation and evidence of CIL. Recognizing the important
role that custom continues to play in international law, as well as the inherent
difficulties of assessing the existence of such rules, the ILC set out to offer
guidance to those not expert in international law on how to apply the international
model.45 To do so, the Commission has drawn on state practice, the jurisprudence
of international courts and tribunals, and its own prior work.
In the early stages of its work, the ILC commissioned a study of its own
historical approach to CIL.46 As the principal international institution with a
mandate to codify existing rules of international law,47 the ILC has routinely
considered, both explicitly and implicitly, the identification question. A
comprehensive survey of the Commission’s rule identification conducted by the
U.N. Secretariat, on topics ranging from the law of the sea to international
criminal law, reaffirmed that the two-element approach had long ago become
institutionalized in the ILC’s practice.48

42
43
44
45
46

47
48

Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law,
U.N. Doc., A/CN.4/663, ¶¶ 66–85 (May 17, 2013).
Int’l Law Comm’n, First Rep. on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, U.N.
Doc. A.CN.4/663, ¶ 66 (2013).
About the Commission, International Law Commission (July 31, 2017), http://perma.cc/965X-6SQ6.
See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/68/10, ¶¶ 63–
107 (2013) (describing the ILC’s mandate to consider the topic).
See generally, Int’l Law Comm’n, Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law: Elements
in the Previous Work of the International Law Commission That Could Be Particularly Relevant to
the Topic Int’l Law Comm’n, Memorandum by the Secretariat, at the Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc
A/CN.4/659 (2013) [hereinafter Memorandum by the Secretariat].
Int’l Law Comm’n, art. 15 (Nov. 21, 1947).
Memorandum by the Secretariat, supra note 46, at 7.
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As of the time of writing, the ILC has adopted sixteen draft conclusions on
the two-element approach to the identification of CIL.49 The draft conclusions
restate the two-element approach: “To determine the existence of a rule of CIL
and its content, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that
is accepted as law (opinio juris).”50
To ascertain whether there is a general practice of States, the ILC elaborates
guidance on the “forms of practice,” “assessing a State’s practice,” and the
generality of the practice. The form of State practice may include, but is not limited
to, “diplomatic acts and correspondence; conduct in connection with resolutions
adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental conference;
conduct in connection with treaties; executive conduct, including operational
conduct ‘on the ground’; legislative and administrative acts; and decisions of
national courts.” 51 To assess a “State’s practice,” the ILC indicates that “[a]ccount
is to be taken of all available practice of a particular State, which is to be assessed
as a whole.”52 And to identify whether the “State practice” element is satisfied, the
ILC borrowed from the ICJ to affirm that the “relevant practice must be general,
meaning that it must be sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as
consistent.”53
The ILC also elaborates the so-called subjective element, namely that the
State practice is “accepted as law.” The Commission explains, in Conclusion 9,
that “accepted as law” means that “the practice in question must be undertaken
with a sense of legal right or obligation”54 and “is to be distinguished from mere
usage or habit.”55 The Commission also explains how such acceptance is
evidenced by the conduct of States, and notes that evidence could include
acquiescence or the “[f]ailure to react over time.”56
To provide more fulsome guidance to those tasked with identification
questions, the ILC also elaborates conclusions on the evidentiary value of
international and national materials. In particular, the ILC provides scenarios in

49

50

51
52
53
54
55
56

The conclusions were adopted on first reading by the ILC at its seventy-first session in 2016. The
Commission will consider the conclusions on second reading at its seventy-third session in 2018.
See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/71/10, at 76–
111 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 Report].
Id. at 76, Conclusion 2 (“To determine the existence and content of a rule of customary international
law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio
juris).”).
Id. at 77, Conclusion 6(2).
Id. at 77, Conclusion 7(1).
Id. at 77, Conclusion 8(1).
Id.
Id. at 77, Conclusion 9(2).
Id. at 77, Conclusion 10(3).
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which a treaty, or multiple treaties, may reflect a rule of CIL;57 explains the
evidentiary value of international organization practice;58 and sets forth the role of
“subsidiary means,” including decisions of international courts and tribunals59 and
scholarly writings.60
The notion of “subsidiary” in this context recognizes the ancillary role of
such sources in clarifying or revealing the content or existence of the law, rather
than serving themselves as a source of law.61 The most salient of such subsidiary
means are the “[d]ecisions of international courts and tribunals, in particular of
the [ICJ].”62 Because international judges are recognized experts in the field of
international law, their decisions on questions of CIL may usefully clarify or reveal
the existence or content of customary rules. Importantly, however, the ILC
cautions that neither judicial pronouncements nor scholarly writings “freeze the
development of the law; rules of CIL may have evolved since the date of a
particular decision.”63
Finally, the Commission concludes that “regard may be had, as appropriate,
to decisions of national courts concerning the existence and content of rules of
customary international law.”64 The inclusion of “as appropriate” serves to caution
that judgments of international courts “are generally accorded more weight than
those of national courts for the present purpose, since the former are likely to
have greater expertise in international law and are less likely to reflect a particular
57

58

59
60

61
62
63
64

Id. at 78, Conclusion 11 (“A rule set forth in a treaty may reflect a rule of customary international
law if it is established that the treaty rule: (a) codified a rule of customary international law existing
at the time when the treaty was concluded; (b) has led to the crystallization of a rule of customary
international law that had started to emerge prior to the conclusion of the treaty; or (c) has given
rise to a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris), thus generating a new rule of customary
international law.”).
Id. at 78, Conclusion 12 (explaining that, while a resolution adopted by an international organization
or at an intergovernmental conference “cannot, of itself, create a rule of customary international
law,” it may “provide evidence for establishing the existence and content of a rule of customary
international law, or contribute to its development” or “may reflect a rule of customary international
law if it is established that the provision corresponds to a general practice that is accepted as law
(opinio juris)”).
Id. at 78, Conclusion 13.
Id. at 78, Conclusion 14; see also id. at 111, Conclusion 14, commentary ¶¶ 3, 5 (drawing on extant
doctrine, including Paquete Habana, the ILC concluded that scholars may play a critical role in
examining the development or existence of customary rules. The value of such teachings must be
carefully assessed, however, to ensure that they seek to record the state of international law as it is
(lex lata), rather than to advocate its development in a particular direction (lex ferenda), whether on
the basis of a national or individual position. Similarly, the products of international expert bodies
such as the International Law Association must be assessed “in light of the mandate and expertise
of the body concerned, the care and objectivity with which it works on a particular issue, the support
a particular output enjoys within the body and the reception of the output by States.”).
Id. at 109, Conclusion 13, commentary ¶ 2.
Id. at 78, Conclusion 13(1).
Id. at 109–10, Conclusion 13, commentary ¶ 3.
Id. at 109, Conclusion 13(2).
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national perspective.”65 Further, the Commission noted that “national courts
operate within a particular legal system, which may incorporate international law
only in a particular way and to a limited extent.”66

IV. I NSTITUTIONAL P LURALISM AND
M ETHODOLOGICAL L EGITIMACY
The notion that there may be variation in how national courts incorporate
international law is what animates the inquiry herein. Though CIL is an
international construct, developed and refined within the international legal
system, questions of CIL arise within national legal regimes across the world.67
National courts are routinely faced with questions regarding the existence and
content of CIL. Courts in the U.S. and elsewhere have thus been faced with a
dilemma: is the appropriate method for identifying CIL located in the national or
international realm? This dilemma is particularly acute where the international
model conflicts with a national system’s prevailing institutional logics for resolving
legal uncertainty.
The very premise of the ILC’s project is this multiplicity of fora, which leads
to inconsistent methodologies and applications of international law. Where a
national judge misapplies the international approach to the identification question,
the prevailing assumption at the international level is that the inconsistency is the
product of ignorance or instrumentalism.68 The misuse or misapplication of
customary law is attributed to a judge’s failure to know or follow the rules of the
international legal regime,69 or its invocation is considered purposive, strategic
behavior.70

65
66
67

68

69
70

Id. at 110, Conclusion 13, commentary ¶ 7.
Id. at 110–11, Conclusion 13, commentary ¶ 7.
This Article proceeds from the premise that the international and domestic legal frameworks in
which identification processes arise are regimes in both the legal and sociological/institutional
sense.
See, for example, Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating
and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57, 69 (2011) (describing judges applying
customary international law as agents of international order or national interests); Elizabeth H. Boyle
& John W. Meyer, Modern Law as a Secularized and Global Model: Implications for the Sociology of Law, 49
SOZIALE WELT 213, 221 (1998) (“Legal decision-making not based on the system of universal
principles is the target of much suspicion. So myths about the importance of universal ideals are
maintained, despite the diversity of local social organizations and cultures.”).
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 28 (explaining certain institutional logics).
Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by
National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 243 (2008); see also Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs,
National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 59, 65–68 (2009).
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Drawing on neo-institutionalist theory,71 this Article examines whether there
is a sociological account that better explains the variation in approaches to CIL in
U.S. courts. This account proceeds from the assumption that U.S. federal judges,
like other organizational actors, are constructed by their institutional
environments.72 The framework of the U.S. federal judiciary is itself an
institutional environment, replete with “rules of appropriateness” that have
become taken-for-granted.73 Such rules are the institutionalized logics that drive
efforts to attain legitimacy within the legal system.74 As such, where an
identification question arises in U.S. courts, there is latent institutional friction
between the international and national approaches to resolving legal ambiguity.75
Plural institutional logics structure judges’ cognitive frames,76 which in turn shape
how judges seek legitimacy.77

A. Legitimacy in the International Legal System
The identification of a customary rule of international law in national court
implicates multiple institutional environments, along with their respective
conceptions of legitimacy. Legitimacy, as used herein, refers to a “generalized
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate, within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
71

72

73

74
75
76
77

The term “institution” is used herein to refer to “any regulative or cognitive feature of an
organizational environment such as rules, laws, norms, and cognitive frames.” GOODMAN & JINKS,
supra note 17, at 11. Neo-institutionalist theory distinguishes between the concepts of
“organizations”—the formal apparatus—and “institutions”—the “regulative and cognitive features
of the organizational environment such as rules or shared beliefs.” Id. at 16.
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 28 (“[I]nstitutional frameworks define the ends and
shape the means by which interests are determined and pursued.”); id. at 14 (“By comparison, the
neoinstitutionalist rejection of intentionality is founded on an alternative theory of individual action,
which stresses the unreflective, routine, taken-for-granted nature of most human behavior and
views interests and actors as themselves constituted by institutions.”).
Id. at 10 (“Organization theorists prefer models not of choice but of taken-for-granted expectations,
assuming that actors associate certain actions with certain situations by ‘rules of appropriateness’
absorbed through socialization, education, on-the-job learning, or acquiescence to convention.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
Id.
See id. at 29 (explaining that, in organizational theory, one form of “institutional contradiction” is
the way in which institutions fit together at the microlevel).
See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way
Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L. J. 83 (2002).
See THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 13 (“Environments, in this view, are more subtle
in their influence; rather than being coopted by organizations, they penetrate the organization,
creating the lenses through which actors view the world and the very categories of structure, action,
and thought.”); GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 17, at 11 (“Once socially defined institutional
environments are in place, changes in organizational form are frequently driven more by
considerations of legitimacy than by concern for rational adaptation or efficiency.”); cf. Lauren B.
Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117
AM. J. SOC. 888 (2011).
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definitions.”78 Legitimacy judgments thus inform the communally sanctioned
sources of law, as well as the institutionalized procedures for identifying and
applying the law.79
International rules, including customary rules, draw their legitimacy from
procedural fairness grounded in state consent, and substantive avoidance of
conflict with jus cogens norms. The legitimate formation of rules in the international
legal system involves a dialogical process amongst states and, at times,
international organizations.80 This process of legitimation is decentralized and
horizontal—states are understood to engage as equals in various rule-making fora,
including courts and tribunals, to develop, contest, and reify norms.
Indeed, customary international rules themselves arise from legitimating
processes. The emergence of a general and consistent practice accepted as law
reflects the institutionalization of a norm by a critical mass of states, the social
actors of the world system. Where a norm has not been adopted or acquiesced to
by a generality of states, it is considered illegitimate and inapplicable as an

78

79

80

Suchman, supra note 30, at 574. Although this definition of legitimacy is drawn from institutional
theory, it largely reconciles with more legal concepts of legitimacy that refer to the procedural and
substantive fairness of a norm, as informed by community perceptions and values. See DEVIKA
HOVELL, THE POWER OF PROCESS: THE VALUE OF DUE PROCESS IN SECURITY COUNCIL
SANCTIONS DECISION-MAKING 62 (2016) (“[T]he concept of legitimacy envisages a connection
between the decision-making authority and community values sufficient to ground acceptance of
that authority in the relevant community.”); Andrew J. Loomis, Leveraging Legitimacy in Securing
U.S. Leadership 50 (Aug. 4, 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file
with author), http://perma.cc/427V-ZHSU (“Legitimacy is premised on underlying legal and
societal norms that form its substantive content. The legitimacy of a principle is merely a signal that
the principle enjoys either widespread or deep acceptance . . . [the standards of legitimacy] are
subjected to the dynamics of power relations in which legal norms and societal standards are
contested.”).
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990) (defining legitimacy
in the international law context as “a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts
a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the
rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles
of right process”); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 51 (1995) (“To
acknowledge this fact is not to concede that legitimacy loses its pro-social content, but rather allows
one to simultaneously access its characteristics . . . while confronting the reality that legitimacy is
not the divine providence of kings and saints. Rather, legitimacy standards are the product of
advocates, academic, practitioners and pundits, all contributing to shift the terms of what is
acceptable in the eyes of the greater public.”).
John G. Ruggie, American Exceptionalism and Global Governance: A Tale of Two Worlds? (Harv. U., John
F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper No. 5, 2006), http://perma.cc/47NN-S2PL
(“Legitimacy emerges out of a dialogical process of persuasion.”); RODNEY BARKER, LEGITIMATING
IDENTITIES: THE SELF-PRESENTATIONS OF RULERS AND SUBJECTS 28 (2001) (noting that the
process of legitimation is “an active, contested political process, rather than legitimacy as an abstract
political resource”).
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international rule of law.81 The international legal order, as a self-regulating system,
thus relies on processes of legitimation and institutionalization for stability.

B. Legitimacy in the U.S. Legal System
The U.S. legal system consists of a largely self-contained set of rules and
values, backstopped by the Constitution. And the federal judiciary, in turn, derives
its institutional models from the cultural processes of the U.S. legal system.82 The
relevant sources of law are typically the Constitution and statutes,83 and, far less
often, foreign or international law. Where U.S. law applies, there is an implicit
understanding that legitimacy stems from democratic processes or the
Constitution. Where foreign law applies, legitimacy is the result of mutual
agreement by the parties to the dispute.84 And where international law applies, its
legitimacy derives from its incorporation by reference into the Constitution or a
U.S. statute.85
Once the communally sanctioned source of law has been identified, its
legitimate application by U.S. federal judges is assessed in light of the concept of
due process, as well as other institutionalized models of decision-making.86

81

82

83
84

85
86

THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 26 (1995) (describing
how fairness in the international legal system is evaluated by “reference to a community’s evolving
standards”); see generally Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 157 (2000) (stating that customary international law serves to ensure that states act in a
way that is considered pro-social).
Boyle & Meyer, supra note 68, at 214–15; MEYER, supra note 13, at 350 (“Modern sovereignty seems
to call, not so much for organizational domination, as for the legalized penetration of standardized
rules.”).
Federal law usually applies in U.S. federal courts, except for diversity jurisdiction cases where state
law may apply.
Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a
Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 890 (2011) (“U.S. courts commonly
encounter claims and issues that are governed by the laws of another sovereign either by virtue of
mutual agreement or choice-of-law rules. Although many courts employing modern choice-of-law
rules tend to favor the selection of their own forum’s law, they continue to apply foreign law to
resolve conflicts arising out of contractual relationships, tortious conduct, employment matters,
intellectual property rights, treaties, and domestic statutes incorporating foreign law, as well as other
legal foundations.”).
See generally JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1996); Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
Due process of law is a process that:
following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and just to the parties to
be affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by the law; it
must be adapted to the end to be attained; and whenever it is necessary for the
protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard
respecting the justice of the judgment sought.
Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884); see also Devika Hovell, Due Process in
the United Nations, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2016) (“It is often said, and history confirms, that the
essential aim of due process is to enhance the legitimacy of decisions.”); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED,
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Scholars and judges have developed decisional heuristics and rationalized
organizing principles—referred to as legal doctrines—that seek to uphold fair
process. Stare decisis—the doctrine of precedent that provides that “cases must
be decided the same way when their material facts are the same”87—is the most
notable, yet doctrines of abstention,88 deference,89 logic, and interpretation,90 as
well as rules of procedure and evidence in adversarial litigation, also shape
decisions. Despite their rationalized origins, such rules and doctrines have long
since faded into the cognitive background of U.S. courts and become taken-forgranted routines. In effect, the rules and doctrines have become institutionalized
models that are reflexively invoked to seek legitimacy within the U.S. legal system
and promote trust and confidence in courts’ decisions.91
While such doctrines are explicit and well understood, less prominent
cognitive frames also deserve mention. Law and society scholarship, for example,
has developed how social context structures a judge’s conception of fairness and
justice. This context includes the social influences on judges’ decision-making,
such as political preferences92 and “peer effects,”93 as well as ideological or

87
88

89

90

91

92

93

CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 108 (1997); CAROL
HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 621 (3d ed. 2009).
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAW 67–68 (9th ed. 1973).
See, for example, Jaber v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 3d 70, 77–81 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding that
whether government military strikes violated international law presents a non-justiciable political
question); Konowaloff v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 702 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 2012) (abstaining
from evaluating takings claim under customary international law as a result of the act of state
doctrine); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within
its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by
this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges
that the taking violates customary international law.
(internal parentheses omitted).
See, for example, Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 630 (7th Cir. 2004) (deferring to determination by the
Executive Branch regarding sovereign immunity under international law). In addition, doctrines of
deference include deference to higher court decisions, administrative court decisions, and the
determinations of fact by trial courts.
There are myriad doctrines of constitutional and statutory interpretation that seek to order and
standardize the application of law in federal cases. See generally FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2009).
Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman, Introduction, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 3 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); Boyle &
Meyer, supra note 68, at 226 (“Inconsistency [in national legal systems] is seen as irrational, and
extreme efforts are made to rule it out . . . in common law systems with elaborate structures of
hierarchical courts.”); Daniel M. Katz & Derek K. Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network Analysis
of the American Federal Judiciary, 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 457, 505–06 (2010).
Judicial behavioralists and attitudinalists have long theorized the linkages between political ideology
and judicial decision-making. See, for example, JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
(Nancy Maveety ed., 2003).
Katz & Stafford, supra note 91, at 460, 464, 474, 505, 506.
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institutional traditions, such as consistency. Indeed, organizational theories have
long described the process by which social processes become taken-for-granted
in various domains of work activity.94 The “juridical field, like any social field, is
organized around a body of internal protocols and assumptions, characteristic
behaviors and self-sustaining values.”95 As a result, its values, internal protocols,
and assumptions develop into habitual patterns of behavior that structure judges’
decision-making.96

C. Institutional Pluralism in U.S. Courts
The upshot of the foregoing is that identification questions in U.S. courts
implicate multiple institutional environments with conflicting conceptions of how
to legitimately resolve legal ambiguity. This pluralism implicates not only
substantive and procedural legal questions, but also social tension and cognitive
frames. Judges immersed in an identification exercise may variously—and
unknowingly—seek to comply with the legitimating scripts of their judicial circuit,
the federal judiciary writ large, and the international legal system.97 Indeed, the
proposition examined herein is whether the variation in approaches to the
identification of CIL can be explained, in part, by the competing and evolving
institutional imperatives at play.98
It is important to recall in this context that the Supreme Court itself has
sanctioned the use of CIL in certain U.S. cases. In 1900, the Supreme Court
famously pronounced that
[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
94
95
96
97

98

Meyer & Rowan, supra note 7; Paul J. DiMaggio, The Iron Cage Revisited, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12, at 42.
Richard Terdiman, Translator’s Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu’s The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the
Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 805, 806 (1987).
Id. at 811.
GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 17, at 5 (“[A]ll actors at any given moment occupy multiple roles,
identify with multiple reference groups, pursue multiple partially incompatible purposes, and enact
multiple highly legitimated scripts for social action.”); WORLD SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 336
(“Inconsistent rules provide counter-evidence to the idea that legal systems are based on universal
principles and thus represent a serious threat to legitimacy.”); PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN
ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 17 (1957) (illuminating how formal
organizations are “over time, infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at
hand”).
See KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF REAL
LAW 11 (2010) (“The idea that different types of society produce, or at least coincide with different
types of law is a foundational element of the law and society framework but is at odds with
commonly held notions of law’s transcendence.”).
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customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the
works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and
experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects
of which they treat.99

While this rendered the identification and application of CIL legitimate in U.S.
courts, the Supreme Court’s dictum also acknowledged how difficult customary
rules are to identify and proposed its own methodology for doing so. Indeed,
federal courts over the years have routinely lamented the complexity of
identification questions. More recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recognized that, as CIL “does not stem from any single, definitive, readilyidentifiable source,” “the relevant evidence . . . is widely dispersed and generally
unfamiliar to lawyers and judges.”100 As such, when confronted with issues as
wide-ranging as piracy, counterfeiting, or expropriation, federal courts are tasked
with resolving considerable ambiguity.
As noted previously, to identify the existence and content of CIL, there is
no definitive source to consult, unlike for questions of U.S. statutory law or
international treaty law. Further, unlike questions of U.S. common law, prior
decisions of U.S. courts on the same or similar questions are neither decisive nor
persuasive—at least according to the international method—as CIL is a fluid
construction that requires a contemporaneous evaluation of international practice.
A prior higher or peer court decision, even if internationally compliant at the time
of its issuance, thus does not properly identify CIL, as it does not account for any
intervening changes in state behavior on the international level. Yet, as deepseated institutionalized logics of the U.S. legal system often generate deference to
such prior decisions, uncertainty arises as to the appropriate identification
procedure to follow, and courts resolve the uncertainty in varying ways.

V. T YPOLOGY OF A PPROACHES A MONG U.S. C OURTS
The sociological concept of decoupling describes the disconnect that may
exist between a state’s professed policy and its actual practice “on the ground.”101
In regards to the international legal system, the lack of effective, centralized
compliance mechanisms produces myriad decoupling questions.102 For so-called
“conventional” international law—treaties and other international agreements—
decoupling is largely a question of national implementation. To assess decoupling
99
100

101
102

Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Inst. of Cetacean
Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1229–30 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
rev’d, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013), and rev’d, 725 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Complicating a court’s
consideration . . . is the difficulty of ascertaining norms of customary international law.”).
See, for example, GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 17, at 43; John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the
Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 154–56 (1997).
Boyle & Meyer, supra note 68, at 332 (“Nation-states, because of their ostensible link to universal
principles, also produce extreme decoupling of the law from practical social life.”).
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requires an examination of any disconnect between national incorporation of the
international rule and its implementation.
For CIL, by contrast, the decoupling assessment contains a predicate
methodological question. As the rules by nature are not necessarily codified,
variations in identification methodology beget variations in substantive law.
Where national judicial methods conflict with international methods, the rules of
conduct identified may also diverge, undermining the coherence of CIL. Indeed,
as developed by neo-institutional theory, decoupling is particularly acute where
rationalized organizational interests conflict with extra-organizational legal
requirements.103 This divergence animates the ILC’s work described in Section III,
as well as the analysis herein.
This analysis differs from the ILC’s work, however, in its foundational
assumptions about the source of variation. Unlike positivist and legal process
theories of national divergence, this Article proposes that variation flows from
institutional rather than motivational pluralism. It queries whether the variation
arises from overlapping, institutionalized models of the international and national
legal systems, rather than individual-level attitudes or understandings as to the
international method of identification.

A. Data and Methods
To test this proposition, the analysis herein considers how identification
methods in U.S. federal courts co-vary with U.S. linkages to world society. The
dependent variable of interest is a typology of approaches U.S. federal courts have
taken to identify rules of CIL. The variable was constructed on the basis of a
systematic review of 327 cases between 1945 and 2015 in which the U.S. federal
courts identified or determined the existence of a rule of CIL.104 From those 327
cases, 410 identification exercises—some cases had more than one customary rule
in question—were qualitatively assigned to one of three typology categories.
The typology’s three categories each reflect a distinctive method of resolving
the legal ambiguity presented by identification questions. The first two—
described herein as the internationalist and voluntarist approaches—reflect
variants of the prevailing international model. The internationalist approach
reflects complete or near-complete deference to the prevailing international
approach—the assessment of the identification question simulates the analysis
and logics of an international actor operating in the international community as
developed by the ILC. The voluntarist approach, by contrast, translates the
international approach. It employs the international model but gives weighted
regard to U.S. acceptance of the norm in question. The third variant, the
103
104

Id.; WORLD SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 333.
The qualitative coding was conducted using MaxQDA software. All coded documents are on file
with the author and are available upon request.
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exceptionalist approach, rejects the internationalist approach and relies primarily
on U.S. foreign relations law.
The independent variable of interest is the total number of U.S. treaties and
executive agreements in force by year. The annual number of treaties and
agreements in force is used as a proxy for the strength of the U.S.’ linkages to
world society.105 This independent variable enabled a regression analysis of how
variation in identification approaches has changed as U.S. linkages to world society
have increased over time. Control variables were also included in the analysis to
see if the variation in identification approaches was influenced by the court’s
Judicial Circuit, the judge’s appointing party (or the majority party in the case of
panels), or the type of case.106

B. Sampling Frame and Biases
Before delving into the statistical analysis, it is important to note a few issues
relating to methodology. As with any empirical legal research project,
methodological decisions were made at the outset. The most fundamental of those
decisions related to the sampling frame, namely the sample of judicial decisions
that would be analyzed. For the purposes of this project, an approach known as
“universal sampling” best served the analysis. Because of the small number of U.S.
cases that engage with questions of identification, it was possible to forego
random or quota sampling. While such methods are used often in the social
sciences, they are necessary only when the total population to be observed is large
and unmanageable. I used the Westlaw database to isolate the available U.S.
federal court cases that seek to identify a rule of CIL. It bears mentioning here
that an overwhelming majority of case-coding projects use this universal sampling
method.
With the sampling method decided, the next key methodological question
related to bias. To begin with, the use of the Westlaw database inherently
introduces bias as only select federal court decisions are included. This selection
bias occurs in two stages. First, West includes decisions that are published in the
Federal Supplement. Decisions are published in the Federal Supplement only if they are
“of interest” to the general membership of the Federal bar or advance
understanding of an area of law. Second, other considerations influence the
decisions that get published. For example, all the substantive opinions of certain
notable federal district courts, such as the Southern District of New York and the
105

106

See Jeong-Woo Koo & Francisco O. Ramirez, National Incorporation of Global Human Rights: Worldwide
Expansion of National Human Rights Institutions, 1966–2004, 87 SOC. FORCES 1321, 1334 (2009) (using
international human rights treaty ratifications as a proxy for the strength of a state’s linkage to world
society). The data on treaties and executive agreements in force was kindly provided by Julian
Nyarko.
In appellate and Supreme Court cases, the appointing party of the majority of judges is used.
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Northern District of Illinois, are included in the Westlaw database. Individual
federal judges may also submit particular decisions for consideration by West
editors, though short memorandum decisions, orders, and other routine issuances
are excluded.107
My content analysis includes only those cases that have been selected for
publication in the Westlaw database and, therefore, does not pull from the total
universe of U.S. federal court cases. This methodological choice necessarily
introduces selection bias. The bias, however, should not affect the generalized
institutional trends observed in this Article. It should be the case that trends
observed in the analyzed sample are reflective of substantive trends in all U.S.
federal cases on this issue.
It is possible that generalized trends related to the identification question—
for example, summary dismissal of cases involving CIL—are not captured in the
sample examined. This unavoidably introduces some bias. While selection bias is
necessarily a limitation of this study—as it is in all empirical studies—based on
the nature of the analysis and of West’s selection criteria, it is unlikely that the
excluded cases would alter the results. Cases that conform to the approaches
examined below may well have been excluded, but their exclusion would only
affect the intensity of the variation described below. Moreover, it is highly unlikely
that cases that substantively engaged with CIL and departed from the approaches
described below would not have been included in the database.108 In other words,
the differences between the studied and omitted cases are likely trivial.109

C. Results and Discussion
The findings of the qualitative content analysis demonstrate that U.S.
integration into the international community is associated with a statistically
significant increase in the number of U.S. federal court cases that seek to identify
the content or existence of CIL. Consistent with the world society hypothesis, as
the number of U.S. treaties in force grew substantially over the latter half the
twenty-first century, there was a significant increase in the number of
identification exercises in U.S. courts. For example, while between 1945 and 1955
there were only seventeen such cases identified on Westlaw, between 1995 and
2005 there were more than a hundred.

107
108
109

See Ellen Platt, Unpublished vs. Unreported: What’s the Difference?, 5 PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEGAL
RESEARCH AND WRITING 26, 27 (1996).
Id. at 27 (explaining that West Publishing’s criteria for selecting cases includes decisions that
question or establish rules of law).
See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV.
63, 105 (2008) (explaining why selection bias is a necessary, though trivial, aspect of content analyses
relying on judicial databases).
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This increase in the number of identification exercises, at least to the
sophisticated international law observer, is likely unsurprising. The increased
invocation of CIL, on its own, however, does not shed light on whether its usage
reflects ceremonial or formal adherence to the international approach. This
decoupling question, for the reasons discussed above, is a critical dimension of
CIL, which relies on a fluid, internationalized method of inquiry.
To unpack the decoupling question, further analysis of how the content of
international rules were identified by U.S. courts is required. As can be seen from
Figure 2 below, the cases revealed that, despite a dramatic increase in identification
exercises, important methodological variation persists to this day. While
integration into world society is associated with an increased likelihood of resort
to the internationalist method,110 identification approaches that stress U.S. consent
to the international rule remain the dominant model of identification. 111

110

111

Ordinary least squares and multinomial logistic regression models were used. See Appendices 1 and
2. For each additional unit of increase in U.S. integration into world society, a U.S. court was more
likely to resort to the internationalist method (as compared to the exceptionalist method). See
Appendix 2 for the full table of results.
The first model (in Appendix 1) indicates that for each additional unit increase in U.S. integration
into world society over time (as measured by U.S. treaties in force by year), a U.S. court was
significantly more likely to require U.S. consent. The p-value is .034—the chance that one would
get similar results by chance—and below the statistical significance level of .05 used for this study.
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Figure 2 reflects that, despite the U.S. integrating into world society, and
despite the institutionalization of the internationalist method of identification at
the international level (see, supra, Section III), U.S. courts have become
increasingly likely to require U.S. consent as an element of determining the
existence or content of a customary rule of international law. In other words, in
contrast to the two-element approach, the dominant U.S. approach includes a
third element. This pattern holds even when controlling for the type of case, the
appointing party of the deciding judge(s), and the federal judicial circuit.
The consent element, while critical, still does not tell the full story. The
content analysis also revealed that there is variation among the identification
exercises requiring U.S. consent. In cases employing the “voluntarist” approach,
consent was used as a confirmatory element to supplement the international
method of identification. After using international sources and methods to review
whether there was a general practice among states that accepted a customary rule
as law, the courts in question rely on the consent element as a complementary step
to identifying the rule. By contrast, other courts—those employing the
“exceptionalist” approach—rely exclusively on U.S. practice or consent to
determine the existence of the international rule.
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Indeed, for a plurality of U.S. courts, there has been an increasing likelihood
of resort to what is, in effect, a hybrid identification method. Rather than simple
adherence to an international or national method of identification, the analysis
revealed that many courts employ a method that appears to seek legitimacy in both
the international and national legal systems.

1. The Internationalist Approach
The internationalist approach refers to the use of the internationally
legitimated model to assess the existence of rules of CIL. Courts exhibiting the
internationalist approach review relevant international materials, specifically state
practice as manifested in treaties, conventions, and treatises, to examine the
evidence of the objective and subjective elements of CIL. The institutional friction
is resolved by deferral to the expectations and interpretations of the legal
personalities and rule-makers of international law, namely the states and
organizations of the international community.112 This analysis, in essence, tracks

112

See Matthew S. Kraatz & Emily S. Block, Organizational Implications of Institutional Pluralism, in THE
SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 243, 255 (Royston Greenwood et al.
eds., 2008) (discussing how organizations resolve disparate institutional environments).
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the international method and seeks to ascertain whether international evidence
exists to satisfy the identification burden.113

113

See, for example, United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 632–33 (E.D. Va. 2010) (engaging in a
systematic review of “relevant sources of evidence of customary international law,” including
international treaties, to determine the international law of piracy); Krishanthi v. Rajaratnam, No.
09-CV-05395, 2010 WL 3429529, at *8–11 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2010) (reviewing the statutes of several
international courts and tribunals to identify the definition of crimes against humanity under
international law).
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International here denotes a broad, geographically representative
examination of state practice to examine the objective and subjective elements of
CIL. As articulated by the Second Circuit, this approach “look[s] primarily to the
formal lawmaking and official actions of States and only secondarily to the works
of scholars as evidence of the established practice of States.”114 Depending on the
case and substantive area in question, the reliance on international materials may
include international treaties and conventions,115 international organization

114
115

United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 103 (2d Cir. 2003).
See, for example, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In
determining the existence of a customary international law norm, ‘agreements that are not selfexecuting or that have not been executed by federal legislation . . . are appropriately considered
evidence of the current state of customary international law.’”) (quoting Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.,
562 F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir. 2009)); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“Treaties, which sometimes are entitled ‘conventions’ or ‘covenants,’ are proper evidence of
customary international law because, and insofar as, they create legal obligations akin to contractual
obligations on the States parties to them.”) (emphasis in original); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 137 (2d Cir. 2010)
Although all treaties ratified by more than one State provide some evidence of
the custom and practice of nations, “a treaty will only constitute sufficient proof of
a norm of customary international law if an overwhelming majority of States have
ratified the treaty, and those States uniformly and consistently act in accordance
with its principles.”
(quoting Flores, 414 F.3d at 256) (emphasis in original); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d
257, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
[T]reaties, also referred to as conventions or covenants, that create legal
obligations on the States party to them, constitute primary evidence of the law
of nations. A state’s ratification of a treaty is evidence of its intent to be legally
obligated by the principles embodied in the treaty and therefore evidences the
‘customs and practices’ of that State.
(quoting Flores, 414 F.3d at 256); Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1154 (E.D. Cal. 2004)
(“The international prohibition of crimes against humanity is explicitly codified in several
multilateral agreements and has been extensively litigated in international tribunals. . . .”); M.C. v.
Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 2d 127, 131 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (observing that the Optional Protocol on the
Rights of the Child, Sale of Children and Child Pornography has gained “widespread acceptance,”
with particular mention of the U.S. and Moldova, the nations of the parties to the case, as
signatories); Viera v. Eli Lilly, No. 1:09-cv-0495-RLY-DML, 2010 WL 3893791, at *3 (S.D. Ind.
Sept. 30, 2010) (referring to Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the Prevention of Major
Industrial Accidents Convention of the ILO, and another declaration as “aspirational conventions”
and thus not supportive of customary rule); Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998)
(observing that “[a] number of international instruments prescribe [sic] cruel, unhuman or
degrading treatment,” and citing the European Convention on Human Rights in particular).
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practice,116 as well as international court decisions,117 domestic court decisions,118
and writings of scholars and jurists.119 The reliance may also be direct or indirect,

116

117

118
119

See, for example, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 888–92 (2d Cir.
1981) (considering U.N. General Assembly resolutions as evidence of state practice regarding the
expropriation compensation standard under customary international law); Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (considering state
practice with respect to international corporate liability); Almog v. Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257
(relying on treaties and other sources as evidence of state practice regarding principle of distinction);
Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 723 (D. Md. 2010) (citing various sources to find a
“global consensus” that torture is not permitted during wartime).
See, for example, Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 (citing decisions by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
affirming the status of crimes against humanity under international law); Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp.
2d 1258, 1331 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing the statutes of ICTY and ICTR applying the commander
responsibility doctrine, as well as ICTR cases identifying that doctrine as a “principle of customary
international law”); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181 (C.D. Cal.
2005) (“[The ICTY and ICTR] recognize claims for cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
Numerous federal courts have recognized that customary international law prohibits cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment. Due to their enforcement in the international criminal tribunals, the Court
holds that there is a customary international law norm. . . .”); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 440 (D.N.J. 1999) (collecting cases and concluding that “the Nuremberg Tribunals
held that the enslavement and deportation of civilian populations during WWII constitutes a crime
against humanity . . . [and] courts have repeatedly held that ‘deportation to slave labor’ violates the
law of nations”); Shan v. China Constr. Bank Corp., No. 09 Civ. 8566, 2010 WL 2595095, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010) (citing the ICTY and Rome Statutes for standard of liability under
international law); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506, 2007 WL 2349343, at *3–4 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (citing ICTR and ICTY cases to define concepts of “widespread” and “civilian
population” for purposes of identifying crimes against humanity).
See, for example, Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 626–30 (reviewing U.S. Supreme Court cases that
incorporated definitions of piracy under the law of nations into U.S. law).
See, for example, Yousef, 327 F.3d at 101 (observing that: “publicists’ writings are not true ‘sources’ of
international law,” but rather:
an acceptable additional source to shed light on a particular question of
international law only when “recourse must also be had” beyond the “opinions,”
“decisions,” and “acts” of States, and only then “to a lesser degree” than to
more authoritative evidence, such as the State’s own “declarations,” “laws,” and
“instructions” to its agents.
(quoting CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1965));
McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 116 F. Supp. 2d 13, 45–46 (D.D.C. 2000) (declining
to draw a customary rule from the writings of one commentator where “international tribunals and
commentators have repeatedly expressed a contrary conception of the law”); Xuncax v. Gramajo,
886 F. Supp. 162, 185 (D. Mass. 1995) (citing an affidavit signed by twenty-seven international law
scholars regarding international agreements that recognize certain human rights); Doe v. Adhikari
v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (relying in part on an affidavit from
professor “describ[ing] the overwhelming consensus regarding the status of forced labor and
trafficking as international crimes”); Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 636–37.
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as in some cases where courts rely on international sources of evidence cited by
other U.S. courts120 or international legal experts.121
While adopting the international approach to identify an international rule
may appear self-evident, the internationalist approach reflects fundamental, and
at times contested, assumptions about the nature and legitimacy of international
law, the institutional character of the international legal system, and its operation
in U.S. courts. By resorting primarily to international sources of evidence, courts
take for granted that the identification exercise is grounded firmly in the consensus
norms of the international community.122 Importantly, courts often recognize the
primary importance of international sources of evidence irrespective of whether
the U.S. has adopted a given norm in its own practice.123 As articulated by the
court in United States v. Hasan:
The fact that the United States has not signed or ratified [the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)] does not change the
conclusion reached above regarding its binding nature. While the United
States’ failure to sign or ratify UNCLOS does bar the application of UNCLOS
as treaty law against the United States, it is not dispositive of the question of
whether UNCLOS constitutes customary international law, because such a
determination relies not only on the practices and customs of the United
States, but instead of the entire international community.124

Indeed, as noted above, the Hasan court’s approach to identifying the
definition of piracy under CIL comprised a systematic review of international
treaties and the judicial decisions of multiple countries, including the U.K., Kenya,
and the U.S., as well as scholarly writings.
For courts following the international method, the decoupling is often
inverted. They will cite the Supreme Court’s recitation of the international model
to legitimize their behavior in the national environment, but actually employ
international sources and methods, rather than U.S. precedent or methods, to
ascertain the law.125 Courts that transpose the international model but tweak it to
120

121
122
123

124
125

See, for example, Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (citing Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880–84 (2d Cir. 1980) (for its analysis of international sources on torture);
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795–798 (D. Kan. 1980) (for its analysis of
international sources on arbitrary detention); Shan, 2010 WL 2595095, at *4–7 (citing Talisman
Energy, 582 F.3d 244) (for its reliance on decisions of international courts and tribunals).
See, for example, Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 903 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Tachiona ex rel.
Tachiona v. Mugabe, 186 F. Supp. 2d 383, 389 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
See, for example, Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541 (concluding that case law demonstrates a “consensus to
evince a customary international human rights norm”).
See, for example, Rodriguez-Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 798 (“[E]ven though the indeterminate detention
of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate the United States Constitution or our statutory laws,
it is judicially remedial as a violation of international law” because sources of customary
international law “clearly demonstrate[ ] that arbitrary detention is prohibited.”).
747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 634 (E.D. Va. 2010) (emphasis in original).
Boyle & Meyer, supra note 68, at 225–27 (describing the phenomenon of decoupling in national
courts, where “rule systems are legitimated by their linkage to universal justice”).
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make it conform to U.S. context may exhibit what scholars have described as
“local rationality within the context of global institutionalism.”126
It is important to emphasize that the internationalist approach does not
imply exclusively international sources. Indeed, it often includes consideration of
U.S. practice and adherence to the international norm.127 In New Jersey v. Delaware,
for example, the Supreme Court looked primarily to the practice of foreign states,
as reflected in treatises, to ascertain the existence of an international rule on
boundary demarcation in rivers, but also looked to the practice of U.S. states on
the issue.128 Similarly, in United States v. Flores, the Court relied in part on evidence
of foreign state practice, as elaborated in relevant treatises, to find the existence
of an international rule enabling states to assert jurisdiction over foreign vessels
disturbing the peace of ports, but also pointed to the invocation of that rule in a
prior U.S. case.129 What distinguishes the internationalist approach from the
voluntarist approach discussed below is that the internationalist approach employs
the international identification methodology without weighted regard for the
national internalization of the norm in question. For the purpose of identifying
customary rules, U.S. courts adopting the internationalist variant mimic the role
of global actors seeking to ascertain the normativity of an international rule by
relying upon international sources and evidence.
Grounding the analysis in international sources also reflects socio-legal
assumptions about the international legal system, as well as the role of U.S. courts
therein. In particular, the internationalist approach reflects key assumptions about
the normative source and legitimacy of international legal rules.130 As it pertains
126
127

128
129
130

See Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth,
105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 411 (1999).
See, for example, United States v. Buck, 690 F. Supp. 1291, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (considering U.S.
practice in reaction to Protocol I of the Geneva Convention as evidence of the lack of general
assent of states); United States v. Enger, 472 F.Supp. 490, 504–06 (D.N.J. 1978) (ILC codification
of customary international law on diplomatic intercourse and immunities as well as U.S. case law
establish that employees of international organizations do not enjoy certain diplomatic immunities);
Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F.Supp. 602, 610 (D. Utah 1951) (treating the U.S. Army Basic Field
Manual as one of numerous sources considered to identify international law regarding belligerent
occupation).
291 U.S. 361, 369 (1934).
289 U.S. 137, 158–59 (1933) (citing United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249 (1893)).
See IAN CLARK, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 207 (2007) (arguing that “the notion of
legitimacy is always mediated through a composite of other norms.”); BARKER, supra note 80, at 28
(describing the process of legitimation as “an active, contested political process, rather than
legitimacy as an abstract political resource”); FRANCK, supra note 79, at 26–29 (describing
“legitimacy” as “that attribute of a rule which conduces to the belief that it is fair because it was
made and is applied in accordance with right process”) (internal quotation marks omitted); HENKIN,
supra note 79, at 51.
To acknowledge this fact is not to concede that legitimacy loses its pro-social
content, but rather allows one to simultaneously access its
characteristics . . . while confronting the reality that legitimacy is not the divine
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to the uncertain terrain of CIL, for courts following the internationalist approach,
both methodological and substantive normativity is conceived to arise externally
to the U.S. So viewed, answers to questions regarding the normative force of
torture prohibitions, for example, arise from the international legal system. That
is to say, for the purposes of CIL, courts adopting the internationalist approach
operate within a legal system and social context that extends beyond the U.S. The
applicable primary and secondary rules, as well as the legitimacy accorded such
rules, thus emanate from the international plane.
As elaborated in Section IV, legitimacy as a socio-legal concept is understood
by reference to the societal frame of analysis. International law neatly illustrates
the contingent, relational character of legitimacy. From the standpoint of the
internationalist approach, questions of legitimacy arise on the international plane
from the vantage point of states and other international actors. The legitimacy of
a rule is a function of the relationship between states and is mediated through the
lens of the international legal system. If the international legal system did not play
a mediating role, and did not do so effectively, the system could not be
normatively coherent. As articulated by the Second Circuit, “[t]he requirement
that a rule command the ‘general assent of civilized nations’ to become binding
upon them all is a stringent one. Were this not so, the courts of one nation might
feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the name of applying
international law.”131 To ensure the legitimacy of the application of a rule of CIL,
then, requires faithful adherence to the internationally agreed approach.
Indeed, those courts adopting the internationalist approach can be
understood to be enacting the institutionalized model of the international legal
system for identifying CIL. H.L.A. Hart’s conceptual distinction between primary
and secondary rules further illuminates the institutional dimension. According to
Hart, law may be understood as comprising both primary rules, that is, substantive
rules of conduct, as well as secondary rules, which are rules that operationalize the
legal system.132 By incorporating the prevailing international methodology, the
internationalist approach assumes that international law is a discrete system of law,
with its own substantive rules of conduct, as well as its own secondary rules to
assess the validity and existence of such rules.133 This recognition also implicitly
acknowledges that methodological consistency is critical to the functioning of

131
132
133

providence of kings and saints. Rather, legitimacy standards are the product of
advocates, academic, practitioners and pundits, all contributing to shift the
terms of what is acceptable in the eyes of the greater public.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d
1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995).
See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 77–79 (1961).
See, for example, Shan v. China Construction Bank, No. 09 Civ. 8566, 2010 WL 2595095, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010) (following Second Circuit precedent holding that that standards of liability
for certain claims are questions of international law).
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CIL, and that courts and judges are, as it pertains to the identification of CIL,
operating within the international institutional environment.
The internationalist approach may also reflect the notion, which is taken for
granted at the international level, that CIL is a dynamic construct, subject to
affirmation, contestation, or evolution through the dialogical interaction of
national and international actors.134 Judges following this approach are thus
accessing and contributing jurisprudence to the fluid development of international
legal rules. This approach reflects the dynamic horizontal and vertical integration
and interaction characteristic of the international legal system and transnational
legal orders.135 The development of CIL, in particular, relies on such recursive
transnational information flows.136 As noted by the Supreme Court, the indefinite
nature of customary rules accords courts a critical role in this regard:
“[i]nternational law, or the law that governs between states, has at times, like the
common law within states, a twilight existence during which it is hardly
distinguishable from morality or justice, till at length the imprimatur of a court
attests its jural quality.”137
Despite the approach of internationalist courts, the legitimacy of
international law, particularly when considered by national courts, is a multi-planar
issue. The identification and application of CIL in U.S. courts also raises questions
of local legitimacy, as mediated by the taken-for-granted logics of the U.S. legal

134

135

136

137

See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 486 (1887) (citing international acceptance of the view
that law of nations against counterfeiting of another nation’s currency “extended to . . . [the] more
recent custom among bankers of dealing in foreign securities”); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp.
2d 259, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Authorities recognize that the growth of int’l law is evolutionary.
It expands by accretion as consensus develops among nations around widely recognized customs,
practices and principles, and not by patchwork elevation of any one country’s ad hoc
pronouncements.”); Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (indicating that “‘law of nations’ connotes a
changing body of law,” and the definition of piracy must therefore be assessed “according to the
international consensus definition at the time of the alleged offense”); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66, 121–22 (1825) (finding that, at the time of its examination, the law of nations did not
prohibit the slave trade, but signalling that this could change over time); see also Anthony J.
Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and
International law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 140–41 (2007) (suggesting “[t]hat the founders viewed the
law of nations as a developing body of rules that might grow to include new offenses may even be
implicit in the text of the Offences Clause [of Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution]”).
See generally TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds. 2015)
(describing the recursive interaction amongst national and international entities across a variety of
areas, including climate change, human rights, trade, and financial services).
See, for example, Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–30 (1942) (reviewing the military manuals of several
countries, numerous treaties, and the Hague Convention signed by 44 nations to establish that “by
universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and
the peaceful populations of belligerent nations”).
New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934).
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system.138 Such efforts to reconcile the national logics with the plural demands of
the international legal system may explain the voluntarist approach to CIL.

2. The Voluntarist Approach
For courts exhibiting the voluntarist approach, the problem of plural
institutional environments is resolved by giving weighted deference to the
institutionalized methods of the U.S. legal system. Rather than analyzing the
practice of states on the basis of a balanced review of international sources—as
the cited international method requires—the voluntarist approach ascribes
particular weight to U.S. practice with respect to the norm in question.139 After
invocation of the international method, the court will typically consult higher U.S.
courts to determine if the identification question has previously been answered
domestically. And where U.S. practice and international practice broadly align,
U.S. adherence to the norm is employed to legitimize the customary rule’s
application.140
Courts following the voluntarist approach consider U.S. practice to be
elemental to the identification assessment. This added weight accorded to national
practice is criticized in international circles for its perceived failure to recognize
the rationality of the internationalized rule-formation process.141 By straying from
strict consideration of the formal emergence of international rules among
international actors on the international plane, according to the ILC and others,
national judges fail to respect the separation between the making and adjudication

138

139

140

141

FRANK J. LECHNER & JOHN BOLI, WORLD CULTURE: ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES, 21 (2005)
(“Any given social situation typically involves numerous different levels of social reality
simultaneously; the global may be only one of many levels of reality, and multiple polities, more or
less formally structured, may be relevant at one and the same time.”).
It should be noted at the outset that weighted emphasis on U.S. acceptance is a distinct, albeit
related, inquiry to the question of whether a treaty is self-executing in the U.S. See Khulumani v.
Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 283 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting with
disfavor that the district court had “overstated the weight [the Second Circuit] ha[s] placed on the
self-executing status of a treaty in our consideration of its weight as evidence of customary
international law”).
See, for example, In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946) (relying heavily on U.S. cases to
affirm application of international rules on prisoner-of-war status reflected in the Hague
Convention of 1907 and several treatises); United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67, 85 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (finding that the U.S. diplomatic immunities statute is “generally declaratory of international
law” and is “designed to give it a specific local application”); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864–
65 (D. Md. 1961) (citing only U.S. cases and a U.S. treatise to establish the legal significance of
passports under the law of nations); Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604, 607–11 (9th Cir. 1951)
(citing to U.S. cases and U.S. scholars to determine whether Okinawa was a “foreign country” such
that the U.S. would be free from tort liability for accidents occurring there).
“Rationality” in this context is not used to denote a value judgment, but rather the notion developed
by Max Weber that a law is “rational” to the extent it follows a dispassionate process of legislative
rulemaking. See Clarence Morris, Law, Reason, and Sociology, 107 U. PA. L. Rev. 147, 148–50 (1958).
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of CIL.142 Alternatively, as viewed through the political lens of foreign and
international relations, according additional weight to national practice may be
explained as a manifestation of American exceptionalism. What this Article seeks
to offer is a contrasting account, grounded in the overlapping social and
institutional spheres implicated by identification questions.143
There is a long history of voluntarism in the identification methodology of
U.S. courts. As far back as 1796, in Ware v. Hylton, the Supreme Court found that
“the relaxation or departure from the strict rights of war to confiscate private
debts by the commercial nations of Europe was not binding on the State of
Virginia, because founded on custom only, she was at liberty to reject or adopt
the custom as she pleased.”144 The Court distinguished customary law from the
general law of nations, which is “established by the general consent of mankind,
and binds all nations.”145 This distinction also maps onto the long-running,
theoretical divide between citizenship and human rights. According to the
citizenship conception, rights flow from participation and connection to a discrete
society, whereas the human rights framework posits that rights emanate from
universalistic (and naturalistic) ideals intrinsic to human nature.146
The modern-day voluntarist approach remains grounded in notions of
consent and state enforcement of territorially delimited social protections.
Voluntarist courts acknowledge the legitimacy of the international method yet
deviate from its instructions in order to ensure the norm’s legitimacy within
territorial order of U.S. society.147 In certain cases, courts exhibit voluntarism when
142
143

144
145
146

147

See id. at 156 (contrasting the formalism of Max Weber with Judge Cardozo’s “method of
sociology”).
See KEN MORRISON, MARX, DURKHEIM, WEBER: FORMATIONS OF MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT 5–6
(2d ed. 2006) (“The fundamental insight by Weber that society could not be understood without
looking at the role played by the overlapping social and institutional spheres cannot be
overestimated . . . To the extent that Weber’s theory of social action called Durkheim’s focus on
external social facts and restraint into question, the concepts changed once again. Weber’s stress on
the role played by ‘judgment’ and ‘evaluation’ in human social action shifted the investigative focus
from the external social rules and ‘outer states’ described by Durkheim to the ‘inner states’ of actors
and the necessity of integrating human inner states into a theory of society.”).
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227 (1796).
Id.
See Thomas Janoski & Brian Gran, Political Citizenship: Foundations of Rights, in HANDBOOK OF
CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 13, 13–14 (Engin F. Isin & Bryan S. Turner eds., 2002); Bryan S. Turner,
Sociology of Human Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 82, 85–
86 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013). Note that citizenship rights, in this sense, are grounded in
Durkheimian notions of organic solidarity, where rules are constitutive of the social system, and
“new elements cannot be grafted on to the old ones without disturbing their harmony . . . .” ÉMILE
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 105 (1997).
As developed by Max Weber, the legitimacy of a rule is recognized even through evasion or
disobedience. MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 4 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward
Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1967). Voluntarist courts feel obligated to reference the international
method and its validity. Indeed, Weber recognizes that “one and the same individual may orient his
conduct toward mutually contradictory orders.” Id.
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seeking to confirm whether a relevant U.S. statute follows the international rule
in question. In Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, for example, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited a U.S. Court of Appeals decision, the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (“the
Restatement”), and the legislative history of the U.S. Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) to establish that the international rule on valid takings had
been adopted by the U.S.148 The court found that the FSIA “reveals a similar
understanding of what constitutes a taking in violation of international law.”149
Yet the voluntarist analysis of U.S. practice is not limited to instances where
there is formal consent.150 In Amerada Hess v. Argentine Republic, for example, the
court first examined international treaties and conventions to identify the
customary international right of a neutral ship to free passage on the high seas,
before turning to an in-depth treatment of U.S. practice on the subject. The court
canvassed additional accords adopted by the U.S. supporting the customary right,
as well as judicial decisions, academic writings, and the Restatement, which all
recognize and accept the identified norm.151 The court thus adapted the
international model to allow for in-depth, weighted consideration of U.S. practice
and norms on the question. Similarly, in Sea Shepherd, as part of a multifaceted
analysis of the international legal definition of piracy, the court relied on
international treaties and treatises to identify general consensus at the international
level before looking to whether U.S. jurisprudence agreed with the consensus
definition of piracy.152
This modification of the international model to account for U.S. practice
and consent has also arisen in cases where the content of CIL is uncertain. In
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, the Second Circuit considered the
international evidence in light of prevailing U.S. practice to determine whether
there exists an affirmative obligation on states to compensate for expropriation
under international law.153 The court’s international inquiry focused on the
practice of various states, as well as international court judgments, General
Assembly resolutions and a variety of American and non-American writings,
before turning to a review of U.S. practice.154

148
149
150

151
152
153
154

Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 711–12 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id.
See, for example, Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 723, 757 (citing a range of international
conventions and U.N. General Assembly resolutions before considering specifically whether “[l]aws
of the United States dealing with foreign relations also suggest that [cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment] is a violation of international law”.).
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 424–27 (2d Cir. 1987).
Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1231–33.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 888 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 888–92.
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While the practice of various other states identified by the Second Circuit
favored a range of different standards, including “appropriate compensation” or
no compensation, U.S. practice favored full compensation. Faced with “at best a
confusing picture as to what the consensus may be as to the responsibilities of an
expropriating nation to pay . . . ,” the court modified the inquiry to consider
whether international law “never requires an expropriating state to pay more than
partial compensation.”155 In other words, rather than relying on its inconclusive
international evaluation of whether there is an affirmative duty to always fully or
partially compensate, the Second Circuit reframed the issue in the inverse. The
court considered whether there is a categorical international rule indicating that
full compensation is never required. By reframing the issue in this way, the Second
Circuit cleared the ground for application of whatever standard is considered to
be fair and just in U.S. courts. While it stopped short of recognizing any particular
standard of compensation, the court’s identification exercise, as mediated through
the lens of U.S. practice, resulted in a permissive compensation standard.156
The Banco Nacional exercise makes the socio-legal dimension of the
voluntarist approach quite plain. Rather than conceiving of the identification
exercise as simply a matter of identifying and following an existing international
rule, the Second Circuit sought to identify a point of normative convergence. In
doing so, the court adapted the international model, conditioned its analysis on
the basis of prevailing U.S. practice, and applied a norm that ostensibly could be
reconciled with the institutional logics of both legal systems.
A consistent contemporary manifestation of the voluntarist approach has
also arisen in Alien Tort Statute (ATS) cases. Following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, courts have considered whether a norm is
universally recognized under the law of nations, and whether it is “sufficiently
definite to support a cause of action” under the federal common law.157 Though
application of the ATS presents a number of considerations specific to U.S. law,158
155
156

157

158

Id. at 891–92.
Interestingly, in an earlier case presenting similar questions, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an
internationalist spirit, declined to pass on the validity of the Cuban government’s expropriation of
a foreign-owned corporation’s assets, noting the sharply conflicting views on the issue among
capital-exporting and capital-importing nations, as well as among socialist and capitalist nations. See
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964).
542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004); see also Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542–43 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“Before this Court may adjudicate a
tort claim under § 1350, it must be satisfied that the legal standard it is to apply is one with universal
acceptance and definition; on no other basis may the Court exercise jurisdiction over a claimed
violation of the law of nations.”).
These include whether the universal norm is clearly defined, whether the relevant conduct was
within the U.S. and whether a private right of action exists. See, for example, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013) (presumption against extraterritoriality applies to ATS
claims); Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) (claims barred under Kiobel
because relevant conduct occurred outside the U.S.); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (finding that new causes
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the predicate question of whether a norm is universally recognized is an
identification question, and U.S. recognition of the norm has on numerous
occasions played a primary role.159
Take the example of Roe v. Bridgestone Corp.160 To ascertain whether there was
an international law prohibition on forced labor, the court concluded that “[i]t
would be odd indeed if a U.S. court were to treat as universal and binding in other
nations an international convention that the U.S. government has declined to
ratify itself.”161 There was no dispute that the U.S. had not ratified International
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 29 and its definition of forced labor. But
the plaintiffs argued that the U.S. later bound itself to Convention 29 by the ILO’s
adoption of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.162
The court did not analyze whether those sources reflected a general practice of
states accepting a definition of forced labor as law. Rather, the lynchpin of the
argument was that the U.S. had not accepted the norm.163
The district court in Abdullahi v. Pfizer took a similar approach.164 To evaluate
whether there existed an international rule proscribing medical experimentation,
the court relied on U.S. practice. The court first pointed to the fact that the U.S.
had not ratified the international standards governing biomedical research known
as the Nuremberg Code.165 Then, the court indicated that the Nuremberg Code
“has not been adopted by the international community.”166 In this way the
Abdullahi court, like the other courts following the voluntarist approach, afforded
considerable weight to U.S. practice in assessing whether there exists international
consensus.167

159

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

of action may be recognized under the ATS only if they “rest on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms [the Supreme Court has] recognized”).
See, for example, Mujica v. Occidental Petroelum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178–79, 1181 (C.D.
Cal. 2005) (finding that the existence of a domestic statute such as the Torture Victim Protection
Act “is strong evidence that the prohibition against torture is a binding customary international law
norm” and that “[b]ased on the Geneva Conventions and their incorporation into the [U.S.] War
Crimes Act of 1996, . . . there is a customary international law norm against attacks against civilians
as war crimes”); Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541 (ATS suit alleging official torture).
492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007)
Id. at 1015.
Id.
Id. at 1012, 1015.
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2005 WL 1870811 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, 562 F.d 163
(2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at *11 (citing cases from the Supreme Court and other courts finding that the Nuremburg Code
has not been adopted as law in the U.S.).
Id.
See also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185 (D. Mass. 1995) (evaluating international
agreements alongside U.S. court decisions to determine existence of international consensus on the
prohibitions of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment).
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U.S. courts’ subsidiary reliance on the Restatement, a treatise written by the
American Law Institute (ALI), may also reflect a voluntarist approach. On many
occasions, support for a customary international rule is grounded in the
Restatement.168 This may of course reflect considerations of expedience as it may
not be practicable for courts to revisit an identification analysis previously
undertaken by the ALI. In certain instances, the Restatement authors have already
conducted an extensive examination of international evidence. Moreover, federal
judges are often not as well-versed in international law as the contributors to the
Restatement.169
Nevertheless, in discussing reliance on the Restatement, it should also be
recalled why the ILC cautions against reliance on scholarly writings and the
products of collective bodies such as the ALI: such writings may reflect the
national or individual positions of the authors.170 The Restatement acknowledges
that it sets out to restate the foreign relations law of the U. S., that is, international
law viewed as applicable to the U.S. rather than by the international community.171
Accordingly, courts that rely on the Restatement and the foreign relations law of
the U.S. as a subsidiary, yet required, precondition to the rule’s legitimacy, would
appear to take for granted that voluntary acceptance of the customary rule by the
U.S. legal community is fundamental to the identification analysis.
Viewed through a sociological lens, this practice of according weight to U.S.
acceptance of a rule may describe a process of localization or translation. The
localization of global norms is a process of assessing the global to ensure
congruence with the local.172 That is, the legitimacy of a global rule is mediated
through established local norms.173 In effect, U.S. courts following the voluntarist
168

169

170
171

172

173

See, for example, Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 22 (D.D.C. 2000) (relying exclusively on the
Restatement for proposition that “forced prison labor is not a state practice proscribed by
international law”).
See Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 49 (1994)
(“Modern jurists also are notably lacking in the diplomatic experience of early Justices such as John
Jay and John Marshall, who were familiar with the law of nations and comfortable navigating by
it.”).
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/71/10, at 111
(2016).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 (AM. L.
INST. 1987). U.S. courts themselves have recognized this limitation of the Restatement, at least
according to norms of the international legal system. See, for example, ARC Ecology v. U.S. Dept. of
Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1002 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) (“However respectable the Restatement may be,
it ‘is not a primary source of authority upon which, standing alone, courts may rely for propositions
of customary international law.’”) (quoting Yousef, 327 F.3d at 99).
See Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change
in Asian Regionalism, 58 INT’L ORG. 239 (2004) (describing the process by which local actors
reconstruct international norms to ensure a better fit with prior local norms).
See CLARK, supra note 130, at 209–26 (describing legitimation through norms generally); WILLIAM
A. BOGART, CONSEQUENCES: THE IMPACT OF LAW AND ITS COMPLEXITY 75 (2002) (describing
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approach are organizations trying to be “multiple things to multiple people.”174 In
identifying a customary rule, voluntarist courts reveal the contested identity of
operating within multiple normative environments and legal discourses. Although
the nationally derived identity prevails, the international model’s translation into
the U.S. environment still exhibits the constitutive effect of both institutions.
Of course, as will be discussed further below, in certain instances the
adaptation or rejection of the international approach may reflect a prevailing
uneasiness with normative universalisms,175 a conscious misuse of the applicable
rules, or a misunderstanding of the international approach. And proponents of
the positivism and universalism of international law would likely lament such an
account as apologist or unduly relativist. Yet, the normativity of the voluntarist
approach is not at issue here. Instead, its place in this typology is merely developed
as a socio-legal alternative to the traditional explanations of national divergence
grounded in ignorance, inexperience, or exceptionalism.176 When viewed in the
light of institutional theory, translation of the international model emerges as a
rationalized method of maintaining legitimacy in a pluralistic environment.177

3. The Exceptionalist Approach
The exceptionalist approach bypasses the international approach in favor of
national doctrines and logics. Most notably, this approach generally foregoes
international sources in favor of U.S. foreign relations law. Although it is outside
the scope of this analysis to speculate as to any ideological underpinnings of this
approach,178 it merits attention here because of its subtle, but important, contrast
with the voluntarist approach. Rather than requiring U.S. acceptance of an
internationally agreed rule, the exceptionalist approach evaluates a rule primarily

174
175
176

177

178

internalization as the process by which “people accept a law when they come to believe in a society’s
underlying values”).
Kraatz & Block, supra note 22, at 244 (quoting CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 8
(1963)).
LECHNER & BOLI, supra note 138, at 22.
Cf. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 92 n.25 (stating in dicta that:
[w]hile it is not possible to claim that the practice or policies of any one country,
including the United States, has such authority that the contours of customary
international law may be determined by reference only to that country, it is
highly unlikely that a purported principle of customary international law in direct
conflict with the recognized practices and customs of the United States and/or
other prominent players in the community of States could be deemed to qualify
as a bona fide customary international law principle.
Yousef, 327 F.3d at 92 n.25).
See Boyle & Meyer, supra note 68, at 226 (discussing the ideal of legal consistency and observing
that “[l]egal fictions are devised so that ‘the internal coherence of the new with the old is ensured,
and thus the systematic unity of the whole law”).
See CALAVITA, supra note 98, at 113 (explaining how the rhetoric of law may be used to mask
deviations based on personal politics and ideologies).
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on the basis of U.S. practice without even ceremonial consideration of the twoelement, international test.
Perhaps the most explicit and consistent example of this approach is in cases
addressing jurisdictional questions. In Hasan, for example, the court relied
primarily on the Restatement to assert that, “under international law principles,”
there exists a so-called “protective principle” of extraterritorial jurisdiction.179 In
United States v. Robinson, the court relied only on the Restatement and U.S. cases to
examine the “protective principle.”180 And in United States v. Marino-Garcia, the
court first employed an internationalist approach—citing to international
conventions and the works of jurists—to find that states assert jurisdiction over
stateless vessels, before relying exclusively on U.S. cases and the Restatement to
support the existence of the protective theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction.181
Courts have resolved other extraterritorial jurisdiction questions by exclusive
resort to the Restatement and U.S. practice.182
Section 402(3) of the Restatement indicates that states have the competence
to regulate “certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that
is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state
interests.”183 Indeed, the Restatement suggests “an expansive state capacity to
legislate extraterritorial conduct that threatens national security,” and several states
have codified provisions that follow the general protective rubric reflected in
Section 402(3).184 Yet, despite some acceptance, the prevailing view at the
international level is that the Restatement’s interpretation of protective
jurisdiction does not reflect a rule of CIL.185 Such primary reliance on the
Restatement, thus, wittingly or unwittingly, identifies a rule that would likely not
satisfy the two-element approach.
179

180
181
182

183
184
185

747 F. Supp. 2d at 606–07. As noted previously, the Restatement acknowledges that it sets out to
restate the foreign relations law of the U.S., i.e., the international law viewed as applicable to the
U.S. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 (AM.
L. INST. 1987).
843 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1988) (relying also on the Restatement to conclude that an international
agreement regarding territorial jurisdiction may be informal).
679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982).
See, for example, United States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d 601, 607 (E.D. La. 1998) (citing the
Restatement, U.S. cases, and one scholar with respect to passive personality after exclusively citing
U.S. courts for five distinct theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402(3) (1986).
Noah Bialostozky, Extraterritoriality and National Security: Protective Jurisdiction as a
Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 617, 627 (2014).
Id. at 630; see also OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 258 (1991)
(“[I]t is not evident that a requirement of reasonableness has emerged outside of the United States
as a rule of international law.”); Cecil J. Olmstead, Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 468, 472 (1989)
(disagreeing with the Restatement’s claim that § 403’s reasonableness requirement had emerged as
a principle of international law); Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31
AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 588–89 (1983) (arguing that the interest-balancing approach reflects the
principle of comity and not an international legal rule).
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The primary reliance on U.S. practice and the Restatement also extends to
other areas of law. For example, in Kadic v. Karadzic, to assess whether the plaintiffs
had asserted international law violations, the court first had to consider whether
the “Bosnian-Serb” entity headed by Radovan Karadzic in the Balkan conflict of
the 1990s met the definition of a state, and it did so by relying exclusively on
Section 201 of the Restatement.186 The Restatement incorporates the criteria for
recognition of statehood set forth in the treaty known as the Montevideo
Convention, yet those criteria remain contested as a matter of CIL.187 Even if the
Montevideo criteria—and thereby the Restatement’s definition—reflect CIL, the
Karadzic court’s analysis and language remain telling. The court speaks in terms of
“the Restatement’s definition of statehood” rather than the definition of
statehood under international law, and cites exclusively to the Restatement to
support additional rules of CIL.188 The court also relied heavily on U.S.
jurisprudence, noting that “[o]ur courts have regularly given effect to the ‘state’
action of unrecognized states.”189 In totality, the Karadzic court’s assessment
reflects an evaluation of the U.S.’s posture vis-à-vis the implicated identification
questions, rather than acceptance of those rules generally at the international level.
As noted previously, it may be that U.S. courts rely on the Restatement and
other domestic sources for ease of reference or out of ignorance. Courts may not
have the resources or know-how to assess international sources, and the authors
of the Restatement have often conducted voluminous research into the
identification questions raised. Yet, even if courts are merely resource-constrained
and reliance on the Restatement is motivated by practical efficiency, that
assessment should signal as much—in other words, that the Restatement’s rule is
reflective of international law on the question. Without such an international tiein, the exercise remains conspicuously disengaged from legitimate accounts
produced at the international level.190 The Restatement, as a treatise on U.S.
foreign relations law, is not viewed within the international legal system as an

186
187

188

189
190

70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995).
See, for example, Jure Vidmar, The Importance of Legal Criteria for Statehood: A Rejoinder to Dapo Akande,
EJIL: TALK!: BLOG OF THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://perma.cc/9ZW9-CSB5.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 245 (“The customary international law of human rights, such as the proscription
of official torture, applies to states without distinction between recognized and unrecognized
states.”).
Id. at 244.
For example, in McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. CIV.A.82, 1997 WL 361177, at
*15 (D.D.C. June 23, 1997), the Restatement was the only standard cited to define takings law under
international law. This reliance was disputed by Iran, the defendant sovereign in the case, and came
even though the Restatement itself acknowledges considerable opposition to its interpretation. Id.
See also Bao Ge, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (relying exclusively on the Restatement for proposition that
“forced prison labor is not a state practice proscribed by international law”).
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authoritative restatement of CIL.191 Moreover, the Restatement was published in
1987, long before many of the identification questions arose.
Primary or exclusive reliance on U.S. sources also arises from adherence to
the doctrine of stare decisis. This variant of the exceptionalist approach further
reveals the socio-legal dimension of identification questions, particularly where
the questions have been previously addressed by other federal courts, especially
higher courts of appeal. Precedent is the foundational institutional logic of U.S.
courts and the common law, and it serves to order the operation of the U.S. legal
system by stabilizing settled points of law.192 Yet, the doctrine of precedent is
fundamentally at odds with the nature of CIL. As noted above, customary rules
are necessarily fluid and dynamic, shifting and evolving in accordance with the
practice and acceptance of States. Even where customary rules are well settled, the
institutionalized model followed by international legal actors is to seek
confirmation from international rather than national sources.
Despite this apparent contradiction in institutional imperatives, U.S. courts
routinely rely exclusively on precedent to identify CIL.193 Notably, some courts
have explicitly rejected the international method in favor of the controlling
decisions of U.S. appellate courts. For example, in Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Authority,
the district court found that
[a] court may look to “the customs and usages of civilized nations; and as
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of
labor, research and commentators, have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat[,]” but only when there is
“no controlling . . . judicial decision” on that particular subject.194
191

192
193

194

Indeed, in Sosa, the Supreme Court noted that the Restatement, while helpful, is “only the beginning
of the inquiry.” 542 U.S. at 737. See also Yousef, 327 F.3d at 99 (finding that district court erred in its
reliance on the Restatement “because such treatises are not primary sources of international law”).
See H.C. Black, The Principle of Stare Decisis, 34 AM. L. REG. 745 (1886).
See Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (“Customary
international law, however, is undefined in the Eleventh Circuit. To determine whether violating
Article 6 of the ICCPR is a violation of customary international law, the Court must first define
customary international law.”); Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 (citing Ninth Circuit precedent
recognizing the customary international law prohibition against summary execution); Hain v.
Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243–44 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing only U.S. cases to find that juvenile death
penalty not abolished internationally); Lopez v. Richardson, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1366 (N.D. Ga.
2009) (observing that one Eleventh Circuit case “would seem to provide sufficient precedential
basis for a conclusion that Plaintiff’s cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment and
arbitrary detention claims are not sufficient to establish a violation of customary international law”);
In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Suit and S’holder Derivative Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301,
1315 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (beginning inquiry into customary law on terrorism by noting that neither the
Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit have addressed whether terrorism is a viable cause of
action under the ATS, then relying on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1091
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (relying on the Second Circuit’s holding that “official torture is now prohibited by
the law of nations. The prohibition is clear and unambiguous.”).
686 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734).

Summer 2020

43

Chicago Journal of International Law

The court continued by noting that “[D.C. Circuit] precedents are binding here,
whether or not they reflect an antiquated construction of international norms.”195
This deference to higher courts also extends to the process of determining
the content of rules of CIL. Some district courts rely on circuit court guidance on
how to approach identification questions. In Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co.,
for example, the district court relied on the “process of ascertaining customary
international law” delineated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.196 Similar deference has been shown to the approach of the Second and
Third Circuits, among others.197 Leaving aside the temporal issues associated with
deference to prior appellate decisions,198 the legitimacy assumptions are plain.
Rather than resort to the international method, courts exhibiting the exceptionalist
approach explicitly or implicitly favor the institutional logics of the U.S. court
system. The courts feel constrained by the hierarchical demands institutionalized
within the U.S juridical field,199 and proceed as strictly national actors in a legal
system where organizational legitimacy is grounded in the consistency, efficiency,
and fairness of precedent.200

VI. C ONCLUSION
The foregoing empirical analysis of U.S. federal court decisions reveals that
more fine-grained consideration is required to understand how competing
international and national models shape processes of rule identification. While
extant international legal studies focus largely on transnational processes of norm
replacement, or recursive interaction between the national and international levels,
sociological institutionalism offers a rich theoretical toolkit for unpacking how
195
196

197

198

199
200

Id. at 30.
256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1263 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (“[T]he Eleventh Circuit described the process of
ascertaining customary international law as follows: ‘We look to a number of sources to ascertain
principles of international law, including international conventions, international customs, treatises,
and judicial decisions rendered in this and other countries.’”) (quoting Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte
Fresh Produce, N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11th Cir. 1999)).
See, for example, Jama, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 362 (“The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not
addressed the question how the law of nations should be determined for the purpose of the ATCA.
Other courts of appeals have taken varying approaches. According to Restatement . . . customary
international law ‘results from a general and consistent practice of states . . . .’”); Almog, 471 F. Supp.
2d at 281 (“[T]his court has examined the very sources of international law found to be valid by the
Second Circuit in Kadic, Filartiga, and Yousef, and by the Supreme Court in Sosa.”).
See Estate of Rodriguez, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (confronting the fact that even though no federal
court has ruled on the question, “this court must evaluate the status of international law at the time
this lawsuit was brought under the ATCA”).
See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805
(1987).
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 12; KAREN S. COOK ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT
TRUST? 19 (2005); Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Yair Sagy, Courts as Organizations: The Drive for Efficiency
and the Regulation of Class Action Settlements, 4 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1 (2016) (reviewing divided
scholarship on the proper role of efficiency in judicial systems).
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plural institutional logics interact to shape behavior at the national and subnational levels.
Despite accelerating U.S. integration into world society following World War
II, federal judges have become increasingly likely to depart from the international
approach to identifying rules of CIL. In contrast to the globally institutionalized
two-element approach, U.S. courts have become more likely over time to require
a third element, namely U.S. consent. Yet, what emerges from this study is that,
rather than outright rejection of the international model in favor of U.S. consent,
federal judges often hybridize the approach to identification to maintain legitimacy
nationally and internationally. That U.S. courts across circuits are increasingly
likely to resort to a hybrid approach has significant implications for the coherence
and stability of international law, as well as its legitimacy and salience in the U.S.
Building from this study, further research is needed to determine whether
the pattern of legal hybridization identified in U.S. federal cases holds across
organizational forms, including among administrative agencies and corporations
subject to competing norms. Additional case studies would enable broader
insights as to the circumstances under which vested national models are subject
to hybridization as organizations seek legitimacy in both the international and
national domains. By going beyond theories of adoption or replacement, such
studies would offer further insight as to the social circumstances under which
international models shape national decision-making and organizational change.
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a) Appendix 1

Table 1: OLS regression of annual cases requiring U.S. consent by treaties in force
U.S. consent requirement
Treaties in force per year

.00017*
(7.96e-06)

Appointing party

.05
(0.056)

Type of case

-.0249
(0.250)

Standard errors in parentheses
N = 218
Source: Westlaw database
* p<0.05
Notes:
Treaties in force per year used as a measure for U.S. integration into World Society.
Appointing party is a dichotomous predictor: 1 = Appointed by Democratic president; 0 = Appointed by
Republican president
Type of case is a dichotomous predictor: 1 = civil case; 0 = criminal case.
This analysis also controlled for the subject matter of the case, as qualitatively coded by the author.
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b) Appendix 2
Table 2: Logistic regression results for variables predicting type of identification approach
Voluntarist
P-value

Internationalist

Predictor

RRR

RRR

P-value

Treaties in force per year

1.000048

0.261

1.000148 0.02*

Appointing party

1.23594

0.389

1.582322 0.233

Type of case

1.85136

0.134

1.563627 0.371

Source: Westlaw database
* p<0.05
N = 218
Notes:
Reference group is the exceptionalist approach (designation as voluntarist, internationalist, exceptionalist
was coded by the author; qualitative coding results are on file with the author).
Treaties in force per year used as a measure for U.S. integration into World Society.
Appointing party is a dichotomous predictor: 1 = Appointed by Democratic president; 0 =
Appointed by Republican president
Type of case is a dichotomous predictor: 1 = civil case; 0 = criminal case
This analysis also controlled for the subject matter of the case, as qualitatively coded by the author.
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